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COMMENTS
IDENTITY THEFT: THE FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING ACT AND NEGLIGENT
ENABLEMENT OF IMPOSTOR FRAUD
Brendan Delany'
Identity

theft victim

Michelle

Brown

estimates

that

she

lost

"somewhere in excess of 500 hours" of her time trying to clear her credit,
not to mention "countless sleepless nights and seemingly endless days,

dedicating [her] valuable time, energy, peace of mind, and what should
have been a normal life, trying to restore [her] credit and [her] life."'

Similarly, after spending over 400 hours trying to clear her name and
restore her credit, identity theft victim Maureen Mitchell explained, "The

impact of being a victim of Identity Theft is all encompassing. It affects
you physically, emotionally, psychologically, spiritually and financially.
This has truly been a life altering experience., 2 Stories like Michelle

Brown's and Maureen Mitchell's are becoming more commonplace as
the incidence of identity theft increases dramatically.

Identity thieves use another's personal identifying information without
his or her knowledge for the purpose of committing fraud, theft, or other
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank his wife, C6line, and his parents for their relentless
support and encouragement. The author would also like to thank Megan Delany, whose
constant insight and criticism made this possible in the first place.
1. Identity Theft: How To Protect and Restore Your Good Name: HearingBefore the
S. Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, & Gov't Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 26 (2002) (statement of Michelle Brown, Identity Theft Victim).
2. Fighting Identity Theft- The Role of FCRA: Hearing Before the House Subcomm.
on Fin. lnsts. & Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 185 (2003)
[hereinafter Fighting Identity Theft Hearing] (statement of Maureen V. Mitchell, Ohio
Identity Theft Victim).
3. Joseph A. Medrano, the co-founder and chief executive officer of Identity Fraud,
Inc., said:
"It can be an
"Identity fraud is very prevalent and very serious[.]"...
extraordinarily invasive, complex, and devastating crime. Unprotected victims
have their lives turned upside down. Clearing one's name, financially and
legally, can be tremendously frustrating, time-consuming, and expensive. As
people discover the extent of their problems, they find that identity fraud exacts
a profound financial and emotional toll."
Press Release, Identity Fraud, Inc., Identity Fraud: Bad and Getting Worse (Aug. 6, 2002),
available at http://www.identityfraud.com/company/prnewswire.pdf.
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unlawful activities. 4 While the true pervasiveness of identity theft
remains unknown,5 the number of reported incidents has increased so
dramatically over the past few years that the U.S. Department of Justice
now classifies identity theft as the fastest growing white-collar crime in
the Nation.6 The growing automation in our economy and the dramatic
increase in commercial Internet transactions further exacerbate the
problem by enabling criminals to easily access personal identifying
information. Such advancements in technology also facilitate the spread
of identity theft across state and international borders.8
4. The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Issues Presented by Reauthorization of the
Expiring Preemption Provisions: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affiairs, 108th Cong. 69 (2003) [hereinafter Preemption Provisions Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs). Stolen information may include a person's "name, social security number,
address, birth date, unique passwords, even biometric information." Overexposed: The
Threats to Privacy and Security on FilesharingNetworks: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 69 (2003) (testimony of Mari J. Frank, Esq.). However, an
identity thief in reality only needs another's full name, Social Security number, and birth
date to open credit or bank accounts under another's name or to drain already existing
accounts. Stop Thieves from Stealing You, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2003, at 12, 13.
5. Howard Beales, Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, acknowledged that "[wie have never had an estimate of the overall
incidence of [identity theft]." Jennifer Lee, Identity Theft Victimizes Millions, Costs
Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at A20.
6. Press Release, supra note 3. Indeed, thieves victimized seven million people in
2002 alone, according to a recent survey by Privacy & American Business. Identity Theft
Victims Skyrocket, Surveys Say, INFO. MGMT. J., Nov.[Dec. 2003, at 17, 17. The U.S.
General Accounting Office has reported that rates of identity theft grow annually more
than 300%.
Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and
Consumers:Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 585 (2002).
7. Preemption ProvisionsHearings, supra note 4; see also Press Release, supra note
3, at 2 ("In today's business environment, in which sensitive information is being
transferred and targeted via the Internet, mail, and the phone, individuals and
organizations are increasingly vulnerable to identity crimes."); Patrick Reyna, Statewide
Grand Jury: We must all fight ID theft, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Nov.
13, 2002, LEXIS, AP File.
Aided by advances in technology, criminals now can easily steal credit card
information in different ways, print fake credit cards or checks, open new bank
accounts, buy cars or boats and even take out mortgages, the [final report of
Florida's statewide grand jury convened in June 2001 at the request of Florida
Governor Jeb Bush] said.
Id.
8. John Ford, Chief Privacy Officer at Equifax, one of the three major creditreporting companies, said that "the scope of the [identity theft] problem is moving
international and moving to larger rings of criminals." Lee, supra note 5. Indeed,
criminals also use identity theft to avoid detection while committing various international
crimes such as drug trafficking and terrorism. Stop Thieves from Stealing You, supra note
4. For example, authorities have discovered that members of AI-Qaeda frequently use
identity theft both to avoid detection and to support their terrorist activities. Identity
Theft: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, & Gov't Info. of the Comm.
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Identity thieves indiscriminately

target all

demographic

groups,

claiming as their victims people from every race, gender, age, and
nationality.9 Identity theft may affect victims in two areas: it can ruin a
person's financial history, and it can create a criminal record in a person's
name." It takes an average of forty-four months for victims to resolve
their cases." That translates into approximately 175 hours spent
restoring one's credit and clearing one's name.12 To make matters worse,
the victim's damaged credit report remains available for distribution for
seven years. Furthermore, most victims do not learn about the theft of
their identity for over a year, long after identity thieves have tainted the
14
victim's credit history and name.
on the Judiciary,107th Cong. 89 (2002) (statement of Dennis M. Lormel, Chief, Terrorist
Financial Review Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (explaining that a terrorist cell
in Spain used stolen credit and telephone cards as well as false passports to facilitate illegal
activities); see also Sheila R. Cherry, Al-Qaeda May Be Stealing Your ID, INSIGHT ON
NEws, Aug. 26, 2002, at 18.
Al-Qaeda terrorist cells hiding in Spain used stolen credit cards to make
numerous purchases, being careful to keep their spending below levels at which
identification would be needed, according to the FBI. Extensive use of false
passports and travel documents were used to open bank accounts where money
for the mujahideen movement was sent to and from countries that include
Pakistan and Afghanistan ....
Id.
9. Fighting Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Tim Caddigan,
Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Investigative Division, U.S. Secret Service); see also
Stop Thieves from Stealing You, supra note 4 ("[Identity theft] is an equal-opportunity
crime, affecting victims of all races, incomes, and ages.").
10. Erin M. Shoudt, Comment, Identity Theft: Victims "Cry Out" for Reform, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 339,342-43 (2002).
11. Fighting Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Daniel L.
Mihalko, Inspector in Charge, Congressional and Public Affairs, U.S. Postal Inspection
Service).
12. Id.; see Stop Thieves from Stealing You, supra note 4 ("Typically, federal laws cap
monetary losses to consumers, but even in routine cases, it takes victims two years on
average to clear their names, according to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a nonprofit
advocacy group.").
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2000).
14. Stop Thieves from Stealing You, supra note 4. In addition to identity theft victims,
businesses and financial institutions also suffer losses from the implications of this crime.
Indeed, according to the Identity Theft Resource Center in San Diego, cases of identity
theft cost businesses an average of $17,000 per incident. Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Setting
New Policies To Catch Identity Thieves, AM. BANKER, Jun. 11, 2003, at 5A, 2003 WL
3346655. The Federal Trade Commission quotes the current cost to business at $18,000
per incident. Stop Thieves from Stealing You, supra note 4. These losses to businesses
Indeed, "[t]he $4.2 billion that
ultimately impact the pocketbooks of consumers.
businesses will lose this year to the crime, a figure expected to mushroom to more than $8
billion by 2006, [will be] recoup[ed] by charging [consumers] higher fees and prices." Id.
Thus, while identity theft may begin as a personal attack on an individual through the theft
of one's personal information, its implications and effects eventually extend society-wide.
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Despite the pervasiveness and severity of the crime, a sufficient
remedy for identity theft victims does not exist. 5 Identity theft victims
John and Mary Elizabeth Stevens stated that "[ildentity theft is only
possible with the full cooperation of three major participants: the
impostor, the creditor and the credit bureau. All are coconspirators and
equally guilty of identity theft."' 6 Identity theft victims need to find a
remedy from the parties that negligently enable the fastest growing
white-collar crime in the Nation to occur.
This Comment explores the legislative development and judicial
interpretation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)'8 with respect to
credit reporting and identity theft. It additionally examines common law
negligence claims against creditors and credit reporting agencies (CRAs)
that stem from identity theft. This Comment ultimately argues for
greater federal protection for potential victims of identity theft and for
common law judicial recognition of the tort of negligent enablement of
impostor fraud. This Comment analyzes congressional regulation of
creditors and CRAs under the FCRA, including the 1996 amendments to
the Act and the recent reauthorization of the Act. This Comment also
details state legislative statutes drafted around the FCRA preemption
provisions in California and Georgia, which are designed to prevent
identity theft by providing better protection of consumers' personal
information. This Comment then explores TRW Inc. v. Andrews '9 and
Smith v. Citibank, N.A., 20 two federal cases that effectively limited
creditor liability with respect to suits filed under the FCRA. Next, this
Comment examines the common law tort of negligence and limitations
on creditor liability under such claims. In so doing, this Comment
evaluates Polzer v. TRW, Inc.21 and Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 22 two
15. During the time a victim spends trying to clear his or her name, he or she may
face denial of credit by lenders or retailers relying on false information, loss or denial of
employment, and criminal prosecution or civil liability for fraud, conversion, or breach of
contract. Couch, supra note 6, at 586.
16. Cherry, supra note 8. Identity theft victim John Stevens further explained:
The perpetuation of identity theft has created a new product line for the credit
bureaus, which now sell services alerting cardholders to significant changes on
their credit reports .... Protecting the integrity and ensuring the accuracy of
information contained in a credit report should be a normal part of their
operation and not just available to those willing to pay them for protection.
Id.
17. See Couch, supra note 6, at 597 ("The consumer should only shoulder the burden
of cleaning up after the thief if the theft was completely unavoidable.... [But,] often the
credit reporting agencies have an indication that a thief is at work.").
18. §§ 1681-1681x U.S.C.A. (West 1998 & Supp. 2004).
19. 534 U.S. 19 (2001).

20.
21.

No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-ECF, 2001 WL 34079057 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001).
682 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1998).
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important state decisions that refused to recognize a duty of care
between credit issuers and non-customers in state law negligence actions.
This Comment subsequently analyzes the impact of the 1996
amendments to the FCRA and Senate Bill 1753 on the growing crime of
identity theft, focusing particularly on the Act's preemption provisions
and possible state legislation in spite of the preemptions. This Comment
then scrutinizes the difficulties for identity theft victims, which decisions
such as Andrews and Smith exacerbate. This Comment next analyzes the
inability of identity theft victims to successfully bring common law
negligence claims against creditors and CRAs. This Comment then
argues for possible amendments to the FCRA that would better protect
potential victims of identity theft. Finally, this Comment presents an
alternative judicial interpretation of common law negligence claims that
would ease victims' recoveries from negligent creditors and CRAs for
suffering caused by identity theft.
1. CONGRESS ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT PERSONAL INFORMATION

A. Congress Regulates CRAs with the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 in order to regulate creditors and
the obligations of agencies supplying them with information. The Act

22. 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
23. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602, 84 Stat. 1127, 1128 (1970). The FCRA's "provisions
regulate the behavior of [credit reporting] agencies and the sources of the information
they use." Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss
Allocation Rules, 64 U. PITT.L. REV. 343, 388 (2003). One article noted that
[i]n
its "findings" in the preamble to the Act, Congress highlighted the delicate
balance it was trying to craft: "The banking system is dependent upon fair and
accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency
of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public
confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking system.
•. . There is a need to ensure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their
grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's
privacy."
MICHAEL E. STATEN & FRED H. CATE, DOES THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
PROMOTE ACCURATE CREDIT REPORTING? 9 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard
Univ., Working Paper No. BABC 04-14, 2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publicaions/finance/babc/babc 04-14.pdf (omission in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)). Indeed, the Act attempts to "balance the competing interests of the credit
reporting industry and consumers." Shoudt, supra note 10, at 349. "More specifically, the
Act 'governs the information practices of consumer reporting agencies, such as credit
bureaus, and the use of consumer reports and the sharing of affiliate information by
financial institution holding companies and other multicompany organizations."' Neal R.
Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the Constitutionality
of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MIA. L. REV. 163, 211 (2001) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)).
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seeks to promote efficiency in the Nation's banking system and protect
24
consumer privacy. The Act regulates both the use and content of credit
reports, which are generated by a third party (the "consumer reporting
agency") based on information supplied by creditors ("furnishers") for
future credit-related conclusions by others ("users"). 5 The FCRA
requires "credit reporting agencies to maintain 'reasonable procedures'
designed 'to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information'
contained in credit reports and to 'limit the furnishing of [such reports]
to' certain statutorily enumerated purposes., 26 Furthermore, the Act
governs the degree over which a consumer controls her credit report,
including the rights of CRAs with respect to the use of such reports and
disclosure requirements.27 The original Act provided for civil liability
through actions brought by individual consumers and federal regulators,
One of the FCRA's primary goals was to create a regulatory structure that would
encourage the creation of credit history files that were factually correct and
sufficiently descriptive of a consumer's credit usage so that businesses could rely
upon the information to make products and services more readily available to
consumers.
STATEN & CATE, supra,at 2.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000); see also Pandozzi, supra note 23, at 211-12
(explaining that because banks depend on fair and accurate credit reporting "[t]o evaluate
its customers' character, reputation, credit worthiness, credit standing and credit capacity
. . . [i]naccurate and unfair credit reporting impairs the efficiency of, and undermines,
public confidence in the banking system").
25. Couch, supra note 6, at 588.
26. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1681e(a)-(b) (1999 & Supp. V)). Fifteen U.S.C. § 1681(b) requires that
consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs
of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in
a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in
accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2000). The FCRA defined "consumer reporting agency" to mean
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose
of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or
facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports.
Id. Viewed as the foundation of our national credit system, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
governs personal credit records maintained by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs),
which "collect and compile information on consumers' creditworthiness from financial
institutions, public records, and other sources." Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra
note 4, at 191 (statement of Michael W. Naylor, Director of Advocacy, AARP). In other
words, the FCRA is designed to "assure consumers that reporting agencies use reasonable
procedures for collecting, using, and disseminating information." Yelder v. Credit Bureau
of Montgomery, L.L.C., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
27. Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 191 (statement of Michael W.
Naylor, Director of Advocacy, AARP).
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• • 28

including the Federal Trade Commission. However, it substantially
limited liability for credit bureaus through provisions that required only
"reasonable procedures., 29 It also "[limited] defamation actions against
credit bureaus for the content of their reports [absent a showing of]
'malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.' 3° "The FCRA also
[allowed] states to enact [their own] credit reporting
laws ...[so long as]
31
they [maintained consistency] with the Act.,
After six years of deliberation, Congress amended the FCRA in 1996
by adopting the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act.32 By doing so,
Congress sought to "enhance the accuracy of credit reports, primarily by
expanding the practical and legal ability of consumers to access, dispute,
and obtain correction of their credit reports., 33 Congress attempted to
prevent the misuse of personal identifying information and the
dissemination of misinformation. 34 In light of the existing voluntary
reporting system in the United States, Congress could have incorporated
either of two fundamentally different regulatory approaches into the
FCRA: the preventative approach or the remedial approach.35 The
"preventative approach" could have enabled Congress to authorize
"specific and mandatory procedures . . . for submitting, verifying,
matching and re-investigating information on the credit files. '36 Instead,
Congress incorporated the "'remedial approach,' which harnessed the
incentives for producing accurate reports inherent in a competitive credit
reporting market, but also established an error detection and correction
mechanism initiated by the consumer."37 The remedial approach does
provide some incentive for credit bureaus to prevent errors, because the
28.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o, 1681s (2000); see also STATEN &

CATE,supra note 23,

at 12.

29.
30.

15 U.S.C. § 1681m(c) (2000); see also STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 12.
STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000)).

31. Id. at 13.
32. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33. STATEN & CATE,supra note 23, at 15. Furthermore, "[t]he 1996 Amendments
aimed to address several problems, including chronic inaccuracy, non-responsiveness and
inadequate reinvestigations by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) and furnishers, the
reinsertion of previously deleted data and the impermissible use of credit reports."
Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 481 (testimony of Evan Hendricks,
Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times).
34. See Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 481 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times).
35. STATEN & GATE, supra note 23, at 21.
36. Id. "In essence, the regulators would stipulate how to run the credit reporting
process." Id.
37. Id. ("Consumers would be permitted (and encouraged) to monitor their own files,
and to dispute items perceived to be incorrect.").
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re-verification process remains costly for both them and creditors 3 s

Thus, "the FCRA reinforces the financial incentive for bureaus to invest
in accurate reporting and prevent those errors for which it has a
comparative advantage."3 9 Congress apparently determined that the
remedial approach would better serve all parties' interests by correcting
the errors
found40by the consumer rather than attempting to detect errors
•
prior to release.
The 1996 amendments aimed to prevent the need for litigation by
holding CRAs and furnishers and users of credit reports to a higher
standard of care.41 Unfortunately, however, "the Amendments have not

achieved their goal and.., in too many instances consumers who want to
protect their good name must sue." 42 The 1996 Act did in fact authorize
states to enforce the FCRA. 43 However, Congress recognized the
"inherently national nature of credit markets and credit reporting" and
thus "preempted the states from enacting statutes or regulations
pertaining to the 1996 amendments."'" The resulting federal privacy
38. Id. at 22. Staten and Cate further explain how all parties share in the costs
associated with prevention and detection of reporting errors:
The remedial approach imposes some additional costs on the consumer as well,
most notably in the event that an erroneous credit report leads to rejection for
credit, insurance or employment. The FCRA gives consumers the opportunity to
avoid the higher cost of rejection by purchasing and reviewing a copy of their
credit report, at any time, as a preventative measure. The 1996 FCRA
amendments placed a ceiling of $8 on the price bureaus could charge consumers
for a copy of their credit report.. .. Responding to swelling consumer interest in
detecting fraud and preserving the integrity of their credit files, by 2002 all three
of the major U.S. repositories (Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union) had begun
offering services to consumers who wish to monitor their credit files on a regular
basis.
Id. at 22 n.81.
39. Id. at 23.
40. See id.
41. Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 482 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times).
42. Id. Evan Hendricks, editor and publisher of the Privacy Times stated, "The
record is clear that credit report inaccuracy, inadequate reinvestigations, CRA and
furnisher non-responsiveness, reinsertion and impermissible use persist to this day as
serious problems that are damaging to consumers and the credit reporting system itself."
Id. at 481. "Reinsertion" refers to a CRA disseminating to a credit bureau incorrect credit
reports which consumers have disputed and the CRA has insufficiently investigated. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5) (2000). Hendricks further explained the difficulty that plaintiffs
face in filing suit under the FCRA, which proves to be an especially overwhelming
experience due to the large discovery challenges and CRA litigation tactics. Preemption
ProvisionsHearings,supra note 4, at 482 (testimony of Evan Hendricks, Editor/Publisher,
Privacy Times). Additionally, very few plaintiffs' attorneys actually specialize in this area,
making it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to find representation. Id.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c) (2000).
44. STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 19.
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preemption provisions4 5 were set to expire on January 1, 2004.46 This
45. Section 1681t of the FCRA discusses the way in which the Act relates to state
laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (2000). Section 1681t(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, this subchapter does
not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this
subchapter from complying with the laws of any State with respect to the
collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers, except to the
extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and
then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
Id. § 1681t(a). Section 1681t(b) provides:
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b of this title, relating to the
prescreening of consumer reports;
(B) section 1681i of this title, relating to the time by which a consumer
reporting agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to
a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of
information in a consumer's file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to
any State law in effect on September 30, 1996;
(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 1681m of this title, relating to the
duties of a person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer;
(D) section 1681m(d) of this title, relating to the duties of persons who use a
consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance
transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer
of credit or insurance;
(E) section 1681c of this title, relating to information contained in consumer
reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect
on September 30, 1996; or
(F) section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons
who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this
paragraph shall not apply(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the
Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or
(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code
(as in effect on September 30,1996);
(2) with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by
common ownership or common corporate control, except that this paragraph
shall not apply with respect to subsection (a) or (c)(1) of section 2480e of title 9,
Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or
(3) with respect to the form and content of any disclosure required to be
made under section 1681g(c) of this title.
Id. § 1681t(b). Therefore, § 1681t of the Act
[under] the 1996 amendments [specifically] prohibited state laws [pertaining to]:
1. Information-sharing among affiliates (except for two provisions of Vermont
law);
2. Prescreening;
3. Notices to be included with prescreened solicitations;
4. Summary of consumer rights to be provided to individuals;
5. Responsibilities of persons who take adverse action based on a credit report;
6. Time to complete reinvestigations;
7. Furnisher responsibilities (except for provisions of California and
Massachusetts law); and
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gave Congress time to evaluate the statute's performance "[g]iven the
dramatic changes that were taking place in technologies, credit, and the
uses of credit reports."47 These preemptions prevent states from passing
tougher standards with respect to the collection and dissemination of
personal information, which could ultimately reduce the incidence of
identity theft.4 8 Additionally, because Congress intended the 1996
8. Time periods for determining the obsolescence of information in consumer
credit reports.
STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
46. Louis Trager, Hill, Courts, FTC, Companies Grapple with Information Privacy,
WARREN'S WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 13, 2003, 2003 WL 16117999; see also
Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 192 (statement of Michael W. Naylor,
Director of Advocacy, AARP). The doctrine of preemption refers to "[tihe principle
(derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any
inconsistent state law or regulation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (7th ed. 1999).
Therefore, a state may not enact legislation inconsistent with such federal laws. The
complete-preemption doctrine refers to the "rule that a federal statute's preemptive force
may be so extraordinary and all-encompassing that it converts an ordinary state-commonlaw complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded-complaint
rule." Id. at 279.
47. STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 17. According to Michael Naylor, the seven
preemptions prevent states from overriding or changing the responsibilities and duties of
CRAs to consumers. Preemption Provisions Hearings,supra note 4, at 192 (statement of
Michael W. Naylor, Director of Advocacy, AARP).
Specific[ally,] the Federal preemptions ... prevent the States from overriding or
changing:
The responsibilities of organizations and businesses that furnish information
to reporting agencies.
The duties of organizations and businesses to notify consumers when they
have been denied credit or employment based on information in their credit
reports.
Procedures that a consumer reporting agency must use if a consumer
disputes the accuracy of information.
The information that may be included in consumer reports, including the
time during which consumer reporting agencies are permitted to report adverse
data.
The form or content of the summary of rights that a consumer reporting
agency is required to provide a consumer along with information in the
consumer's file.
The exchange of information among affiliated institutions.
Prescreening procedures that provide consumers with credit or other
financial services or product lines.
Id.
48. See Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 192 (statement of Michael
W. Naylor, Director of Advocacy, AARP); id. at 492 (testimony of Evan Hendricks,
Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times). Unfortunately, these preemptions make it difficult for
Id.
states to protect consumers with respect to personal identifying information.
("[C]onsumer protection would be advanced by [allowing] States to protect their citizens
in these areas, particularly if Congress is unable to enact a sufficiently strong national
standard.").
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amendments to completely obstruct state law, the preemptions prohibit
states from imposing stronger duties on CRAs.49
Although states may not enact legislation dealing specifically with the
subject of the 1996 amendments, the California and Georgia Legislatures
have nonetheless enacted preventative measures to address privacy and
increase consumer protections against identity theft. 0 The Social
Security number plays an extremely significant role in personal
identification in the United States with respect to record-linkage and
personal privacy.s Because many instances of identity theft occur when
impostors steal personally identifying information (such as Social
Security numbers) from discarded mail, the legislatures in both
California and Georgia "have enacted legislation to limit the''2
1
reproduction of the [Social Security number] in the private sector.
These legislatures believe that individuals need better protection from
impostors maliciously attempting to steal their Social Security numbers,
and thus have enacted stricter statutes without violating the FCRA's
preemption provisions. 3
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(D) (2000). "The FCRA's preemption provision
covers information-sharing among affiliates without specifically limiting the information's
scope to 'consumer reports."' Pandozzi, supranote 23, at 212. The provision thus "trumps
any state law that will prevent or restrict information exchanges between affiliates." Id.
50. Preservingthe Integrity of Social Security Numbers and Preventing Their Misuse
by Terrorists and Identity Thieves: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Social
Sec. of the Comm. on Ways & Means and the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. &
Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary,107th Cong. 79, 83 (2002) (statement of Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Legislative Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
51. Id. at 78.
52. Id. at 78-80, 83. In California, Senate Bill 168 provides
individuals the ability to request that a "security alert" be placed on their credit
record via a toll-free phone number. The bill also enables Californians to
request a "security freeze" that prevents credit agencies from releasing personal
information from an individual's credit report. The bill places important
restrictions on use of the [Social Security number]-public posting of a [Social
Security number] and printing the [Social Security number] on an identity card
or document used to obtain a product or service is prohibited. Businesses that
use the [Social Security number] to identify customers, such as utility companies,
will no longer be permitted to print the [Social Security number] on invoices or
bills sent through the mail.
Id. at 83. In Georgia, businesses now must
safely dispose of records that contain personal identifiers. Business recordsincluding data stored on computer hard drives-must be shredded or in the case
of electronic records, completely wiped clean where they contain [Social Security
numbers], driver's license numbers, dates of birth, medical information, account
balances, or credit limit information. The Georgia law carries penalties up to
$10,000.
Id.
53. See id. "Without a framework of restrictions on the collection and use of the
[Social Security number] and other personal identifiers, identity theft will continue to
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Recognizing the changing nature of the credit markets in the U.S.
economy, Congress reexamined the FCRA 4 The Senate recently passed
legislation (Senate Bill 1753) 51 to reauthorize the FCRA, "making
permanent national credit reporting standards and imposing new
obligations on credit reporting agencies and federal regulators to combat
identity theft and encourage more accurate reporting of consumer credit
information. ' 56 The Senate bill contains provisions "to combat identity
theft, restrict the sharing of consumer information, and improve the
accuracy of credit reports."57 Furthermore, the bill would "extend the

increase, endangering individuals' privacy and perhaps the security of the Nation." Id. at
84.
54. See Preemption ProvisionsHearings,supra note 4. Senator Shelby explained:
In just the 6 years since the Fair Credit Reporting Act was last amended,
significant changes have occurred. There are new participants, new technologies,
new information use practices, and new products. Indeed, there is more that has
changed than has remained the same in the operation of the credit markets since
the last time Congress considered the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
While many of these changes introduced positive features, such as more
credit and an expedited process for obtaining credit, not every new development
has been positive. Unfortunately, as our economy has grown more automated,
allowing more and more depersonalized transactions to occur, and, as the
transfer of personally identifiable information has become much more frequent,
a new type of crime that takes advantage of these circumstances has emergedidentity theft.
Id.
55. Senate Passes Fair Credit Reporting Bill; Measure Moves to House-Senate
Conference, 72 U.S.L.W. 2263, 2263 (Nov. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Senate Passes Bill]. The
National Consumer Credit Reporting System Improvement Act of 2003 was passed by a
roll-call vote of 95-2. Id. The House passed a similar bill, House Bill 2622, on September
10, 2003. Id. According to a House Financial Services spokesman, "[t]he biggest
difference between the two bills is a provision in the Senate bill that would give consumers
an opt-out from marketing solicitations based on information shared by affiliated
institutions ....
Another area for resolution relates to differences in the requirements for
notices of counter-offers of credit." Id.
56. Id. Furthermore, "the bill would make the national credit reporting standards
permanent by eliminating a Jan. 1, 2004, sunset from the statute's preemption of state
credit reporting laws." Id.
57. Id.
[T]he bill ... would require [CRAs] to take the following steps:
upon a consumer's good faith allegation and request, to include a fraud alert
in the consumer's credit file for at least 90 days;
upon the request of a consumer who files an identity theft report, or upon
receipt of a properly completed copy of a Federal Trade Commission-developed
and standardized affidavit of identity theft, to include a fraud report in the
consumer's file for seven years;
block the reporting of information that the consumer alleges resulted from
identity theft; and
refer such fraud alert to consumer reporting agencies.
Other provisions target identity theft by:
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statute of limitations for civil liability for violations of the FCRA from

two to seven years after the date on which the violation occurs, but not
later than two years after the violation is discovered."58' The Andrews

case, discussed below, demonstrates how such an extension of the statute
of limitations will assist identity theft victims trying to clear their tainted
record.59
B. CreditorLiability Remains Limited Under the FCRA
1. The Supreme Court Narrowly Interprets the Statute of Limitations
for Actions Brought Under the FCRA

In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the statute of limitations
for suits filed under the FCRA in Andrews.60 In that case, a physician's

office receptionist attempted to open credit accounts using patient
Adelaide Andrews' Social Security number." In response, Andrews filed
mandating the truncation of credit and debit card numbers, with printing of
no more than the last five digits;
imposing new duties on companies furnishing information to credit reporting
agencies and on debt collectors; and
allowing consumers to access their credit reports once a year without charge
and when fraud alerts are placed on the report.
Id. at 2263-64.
58. Id. at 2263.
59. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (interpreting the FCRA's statute of
limitations strictly and holding that Andrews was barred from relief under the Act because
she filed her complaint after the two-year statute of limitations had run, even though she
had only discovered her victimization seventeen months before filing suit); see infra Part
I.B.1.
60. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 22; see also David E. Worsley, Fair Credit Reporting Cases
IllustrateRisks for Credit Reporting Agencies, Creditors, and Lawyers, 56 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 68, 70-71 (2002), WL 56 CONFLQR 68.
61. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 23-24. The impostor stole Andrews' information "simply by
misusing her position as a doctor's receptionist and copying the information that
[Andrews], as a patient in that office, supplied to the doctor." Andrews v. TRW Inc., 225
F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
[Specifically, o]n June 17, 1993, the plaintiff (Andrews) visited a radiologist's
office in Santa Monica, California. She filled out a new patient form listing
certain basic information, including her name, birth date, and social security
number. Andrews handed the form to the office receptionist, one Andrea
Andrews (the Impostor), who copied the information and thereafter moved to
Las Vegas, Nevada. Once there, the Impostor attempted on numerous occasions
to open credit accounts using Andrews' social security number and her own last
name and address.
On four of those occasions, the company from which the Impostor sought
credit requested a report from TRW. Each time, TRW's computers registered a
match between Andrews' social security number, last name, and first initial and
responded by furnishing her file. TRW disclosed Andrews' credit history at the
Impostor's request to a bank on July 25, 1994, to a cable television company on
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suit against TRW and Trans Union Corp., claiming that the two
defendant CRAs "violated § 1681e(a) of the FCRA, which prohibits
disclosure of consumer reports to third parties except for certain
enumerated permissible purposes, such as credit transactions in which
the consumer is involved., 62 Andrews claimed that TRW improperly
disclosed her information in response to an impostor's credit application
"because TRW failed to verify, predisclosure, that [she] initiated the
6

requests or was otherwise involved in the underlying transactions. 1
Andrews further argued that "by processing requests that matched her
profile on Social Security number, last name, and first initial but did not
correspond on other key identifiers, notably birth date, address, and first
name, TRW had facilitated the Impostor's identity theft." '
September 27, 1994, to a department store on October 28, 1994, and to another
credit provider on January 3, 1995. All recipients, except the cable company,
rejected the Impostor's applications for credit.
Andrews did not learn of these disclosures until May 31, 1995, when she
sought to refinance her home mortgage and, in the process, received a copy of
her credit report reflecting the Impostor's activity. Andrews conceded that TRW
promptly corrected her file upon learning of its mistake. She alleged, however,
that the blemishes on her report not only caused her inconvenience and
emotional distress, they also forced her to abandon her refinancing efforts and
settle for an alternative line of credit on less favorable terms.
On October 21, 1996, almost 17 months after she discovered the Impostor's
fraudulent conduct and more than two years after TRW's first two disclosures,
Andrews filed suit.
Worsley, supra note 60, at 71.
62. Shoudt, supra note 10, at 349-50 (footnote omitted). Fifteen U.S.C. § 1681e(a)
provides that "[n]o consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any
person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report will not be used
for a purpose listed in section 1681b of this title." 15 U.S.C. 1681e(a) (2000).
Section 1681b authorizes certain limited conditions and circumstances under
which a consumer's credit report may be produced to a third party, including the
allowance that a credit reporting agency may furnish a consumer report "to a
person which it has reason to believe . . . intends to use the information in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the
information is to be furnished ......
Shoudt, supra note 10, at 350 n.85 (omissions in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(a)(3)(A) (2000)).
Andrews claimed that the agencies had supplied her
information for impermissible purposes under the Act, because their belief that she was in
fact the consumer involved in the transactions was not reasonable. Id. at 350-51.
63. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 25. Therefore, Andrews claimed that TRW violated
§ 1681e(a) of the FCRA by its failure to employ reasonable verification procedures to
prevent improper disclosures. Id.
64. Id. Andrews alleged that the defendants violated § 1681e(b), "which requires
credit reporting agencies to 'follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates."'
Shoudt, supra note 10, at 350-51 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2000)).
[Specifically, Andrews] sought injunctive relief, punitive damages, and
compensation for the 'expenditure of time and money, commercial impairment,

2005]

Identity Theft

In examining Andrews' claims, however, the Court determined that
the general discovery rule65 did not apply to toll the statute of limitations
on an improper disclosure claim under the FCRA until the consumer's
discovery of the CRA's improper decisions. 66 Under § 1681p of the
FCRA, a party must bring any action to enforce liability created under
the Act
"within two years from the date on which the liability arises,
except that where a defendant has ...

willfully misrepresented

any information required under [the FCRA] to be disclosed to
[the plaintiff] and the information . . . is material to [a claim

under the FCRA], the action may be brought at any time within
two years after [the plaintiff's] discovery of the
misrepresentation. ,67

inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress' that TRW
had allegedly inflicted upon her.
TRW moved for partial summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the
FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Andrews' claims based on the July
25 and September 27, 1994 disclosures because both occurred more than two
years before she brought suit. Andrews countered that her claims as to all four
disclosures were timely because the limitations period did not commence until
May 31, 1995, the date she learned of TRW's alleged wrongdoing.
Worsley, supra note 60, at 71. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the
CRAs on Andrews' first claim of improper disclosures under § 1681e(a) of the FCRA
based on the statute of limitations. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056,
1057 (C.D. Cal. 1998), afjd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225
F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 19 (2001). In granting summary judgment for the
defendants, "the court reasoned that the existence of the exception in § 1681p-applying
the discovery rule when the defendant made a material and willful misrepresentationimplied that Congress did not intend for the discovery rule to apply to all FCRA cases."
Shoudt, supra note 10, at 352. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
entry of partial summary judgment based on precedent holding that, as a general rule, "a
federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that
she was injured." Andrews v. TRW Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd,
534 U.S. 19 (2001).
65. The general discovery rule states that the statute of limitations will not run "until
the plaintiff has in fact discovered that he has suffered injury, or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered it." W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). Most states,
however, have enacted legislation limiting the time in which negligence claims can be
brought. Id.
66. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 26. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict between the Ninth Circuit's holding that § 1681p of the FCRA incorporates a
general discovery rule and four other circuits, which concluded that a discovery exception
other than that expressed by Congress may not be read into the Act. id.
68
67. Worsley, supra note 60, at 71 (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 1p).
circumstances
exceptional
the
not
fall
within
The Court held that Andrews' case did
explicitly delineated in § 1681p in which discovery triggers the two-year statute of
limitations. Id.
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The Court held that "[t]he Ninth Circuit .. .erred in holding that a
generally applied discovery rule controls this case."
Due to the
Andrews decision, "victims ...[lost] their opportunity to file a claim
against a credit reporting agency for improper disclosures if they learn of
the occurrence of a violation at any time after the two-year statute of
limitations has expired., 69 This placed a significant burden on victims of
identity theft, ultimately imposing upon them considerable financial and
psychological losses."
2. A Missouri Court Holds that Banks Owe No Duty of Care to Noncustomers
In Smith v. Citibank, N.A.

,7'Robin

Smith's former employer stole his

personal information and applied for a credit card in his name, which was
issued by Citibank with the imposter as the secondary card holder.
Smith sued Citibank alleging that the bank was negligent in opening a
credit account in his name on the basis of stolen personal information. 73
Smith further alleged that Citibank was negligent in its investigation of
disputes regarding liability for amounts due on the account.74

After rejecting the merits of Smith's negligence claim, the court stated
that, in any event, the claim would have failed because Smith failed to

notify the agency directly of a dispute pursuant to § 1681i(a)(1) of the
Act. 75 Because "[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence that Smith [ever]
68. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 28. The Court further held that "beyond doubt, we have
never endorsed the Ninth Circuit's view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a
discovery rule only by explicit command, rather than by implication from the structure or
text of the particular statute." Id. at 27-28.
Thus, even if the presumption identified by the Ninth Circuit exists, it would not
apply to the FCRA, because the FCRA does not govern an area of law that cries
out for application of a discovery rule and was not silent on the issue of when the

statute of limitations begins to run.
Worsley, supra note 60, at 72. Additionally, the Court stated that the "most natural
reading of § 1681p is that Congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by
explicitly including a more limited one," and further that "incorporating a general
discovery rule into section 1681p . . .would in practical effect render that exception
entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances." Andrews, 534 U.S. at 2829.
69. Shoudt, supra note 10, at 345-46.
70. Id. at 356.
71. No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-EZF, 2001 WL 34079057 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001).
72. Id. at *1. Smith's former employer, Joseph Wilkinson "had access to Smith's
personal information" and "directed the bills to subsequently be sent to his business
address." Id.
73.
74.
75.
duty to

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2-3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2000). In addressing the bank's
investigate, the court stated that such a duty under § 1681 of the FCRA was not
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notified [any CRAs,] . . . Defendants duty to investigate was [never]
triggered."76 Therefore, the court declined to find breach of the duty to
investigate Smith's dispute." This highlights the difficulty for the many
identity theft victims who remain unaware of the statutory procedures
for having disputes investigated.
C. CreditorLiability Remains Limited Under Common Law Negligence
Claims
In addition to identity theft victims seeking recourse based on
violations of the FCRA, some victims file suit alleging state law
negligence." These plaintiffs specifically ask courts to recognize a new
cause of action: negligent enablement of impostor fraud.79 Courts,
however, have refused to create a new tort of negligent enablement of
impostor fraud because they "decline to recognize a legal duty of care
between credit card issuers and those individuals whose identities may be
stolen."8'

triggered, because Smith presented no evidence that he specifically notified consumer
reporting agencies of his dispute. Smith, 2001 WL 34079057, at *3. Section 1681s-2(b)(1)
of the FCRA addresses the responsibilities of banks that furnish information to CRAs
stating: "After receiving notice . . . of a dispute with regard to the completeness or
accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the
person shall . . . conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information. 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) (2000). In holding that the defendants' duties to investigate
were not triggered, the Smith court relied on precedent recognizing "the requirement that
before a furnisher of information must investigate a dispute, the consumer must first notify
the agency, who will then notify the furnisher of information." Smith, 2001 WL 34079057,
at *3. The court held that Smith's negligence claim focusing on defendants' failure to
conduct a proper investigation was outside the realm of the FCRA, and that "[e]ven if [it]
was properly brought pursuant to the FCRA, the claim would fail." Id.
76. Smith, 2001 WL 34079057, at *3 (citations omitted).
77. Id. In response to Smith's claim that defendants were "negligent in opening a
credit account in [his] name and in investigating disputes regarding liability for amounts
due on the account," the Smith court relied on previous decisions with respect to duty,
stating that courts have held that banks do not owe a duty of care to those persons who are
not their customers. Id. at *2. Because Smith maintained in his deposition that he was not
a customer of the defendant banks, and further failed to present evidence of a duty owed
to him by defendants, the court held that Smith failed to state a claim for state law
negligence. Id.
78. See, e.g., Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 682 N.YS.2d 194 (App. Div. 1998); Huggins v.
Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
79. See, e.g., Polzer, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 195; Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 276.
80. See Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277-78. One based its reasoning on the fact that "the
relationship, if any, between credit card issuers and potential victims of identity theft is far
too attenuated to rise to the level of a duty between them." Id. at 277.
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Negligent conduct is that which "falls below the standard established

by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."'8'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the standard of conduct to

which an actor must conform as "that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances." 8 2 In order to establish a claim for negligence, the
plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages.83 Duty "may

be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and
' 81
effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another."
In other words, duty is the obligation "to conform to the legal standard

81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines the elements of a cause of action for negligence as follows:
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if: (a) the interest
invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and (b) the conduct of the
actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of persons within which he
is included, and (c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d)
the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an
action for such invasion.
Id. § 281.
82. Id. § 464. The term "actor" refers to anyone other than a child or an insane
person. Id. The reasonable person is a "personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior, determined by the jury's social judgment. The conduct of the
reasonable person will vary with the situation with which he is confronted." KEETON ET
AL., supra note 65, § 32.
83. Smith v. Citibank, N.A., No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-EZF, 2001 WL 34079057, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001). More specifically, the traditional formula for the elements of
negligence is:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a
breach of the duty. These two elements go to make up what the courts usually
have called negligence; but the term quite frequently is applied to the second
alone. Thus it may be said that the defendant was negligent, but is not liable
because he was under no duty to the plaintiff not to be.
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause," or "proximate
cause," and which includes the notion of cause in fact.
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another. Since the
action for negligence developed chiefly out of the old form of action on the case,
it retained the rule of that action, that proof of damage was an essential part of
the plaintiff's case. Nominal damages, to vindicate a technical right, cannot be
recovered in a negligence action, where no actual loss has occurred. The threat
of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough. Negligent conduct in itself is not
such an interference with the interests of the world at large that there is any right
to complain of it, or to be free from it, except in the case of some individual
whose interests have suffered.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 30 (footnotes omitted).
84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 53.
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of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk., 85 Two views exist
concerning liability with respect to the risk involved: (1) limitation of
liability to risk and (2) liability beyond the risk. 816
First, the "limitation of liability to risk" theory provides that
the same criterion of foreseeability and risk of harm which
determined whether the defendant was negligent in the first
instance should determine the extent of the liability for that
negligence; and that no defendant should ever be held liable for
consequences which no reasonable person would expect to
follow from the conduct."7
Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff depends on the risk of

harm and the foreseeable consequences.8 Therefore, "[i]f one could not
reasonably foresee any injury as the result of one's act, or if one's
conduct was reasonable in the light of what one could anticipate, there
would be no negligence, and no liability."'' Indeed, one "will not be held
to knowledge of risks which are not known or apparent to him."9°
Second, the "liability beyond the risk" theory provides "that a
defendant who is negligent must take existing circumstances as they are,
and may be liable for consequences brought about by the defendant's
acts, even though they were not reasonably to be anticipated."91 This
85.

Id.

86. Id. § 43.
87. Id. ("The limitation, in other words, is to foreseeable consequences, and liability
is restricted to the scope of the original risk created, with the test of responsibility for the
result identical with the test for negligence.").
88. See id. Negligence "necessarily involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger
of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion to that danger." Id.
89.

Id.

90. Id. § 32. However, the defendant may nevertheless stand in a "special
relationship" with the plaintiff such that an obligation to investigate and obtain knowledge
arises. See id. In other words, the defendant may
be engaged in an activity, or stand in a relation to othcrs, which imposes on him
an obligation to investigate and find out, so that the person becomes liable not so
much for being ignorant as for remaining ignorant; and this obligation may
require a person to know at least enough to conduct an intelligent inquiry as to
what he does not know.
Id.

91. Id. § 43. In other words, "what the defendant could foresee is important in
determining whether the defendant was negligent in the first instance, but not at all
decisive in determining the extent of the consequences for which, once negligent, the
defendant will be liable." Id. Prosser and Keeton further explain:
"If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or
might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be
negligent at all; but if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it is
equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could
have foreseen them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is that if the act is one
which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was
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theory rests on the notion that as between an innocent plaintiff and a
negligent defendant "the burden of loss due to consequences beyond the
risk should fall, within some quite undefined ultimate limits, upon the
wrongdoer.,9'
1. New York's IntermediateAppellate Court Refuses to Recognize
Negligent Enablement of Impostor Fraud
In Polzer v. TRW, Inc.,93 the plaintiffs, individuals whose personal

information impostors had stolen and used to obtain credit cards,
claimed that the defendant issuers

of credit negligently allowed

impostors to obtain the credit cards in their names. The plaintiffs
specifically accused the banks of "facilitat[ing] and exacerbat[ing] the
harm plaintiffs suffered." 95 The trial court, however, held that New York
did not recognize a cause of action for negligent enablement of impostor

liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately
resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury
which did happen. Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without
an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and
proximate, and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible,
even though he could not have foreseen the particular result which did follow."
Id. n.82 (quoting Christianson v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 69 N.W.
640 (Minn. 1896)).
92. Id. § 43. Thus, the negligent defendant should be liable because his negligence
caused the plaintiff's injury more so than did any act by the innocent plaintiff. See id.
93. Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1998).
94. See id. at 195.
[Specifically, p]laintiffs had impeccable credit histories. The plaintiffs believed
that their identities were stolen during the summer of 1994 by an imposter, who
either copied, or obtained a copy of, a credit application they had submitted to a
The imposter, armed with the plaintiffs' personal
bank for a car loan.
identification information, as well as all of their legitimate credit account
numbers, quickly went to work changing their address at the plaintiffs' banks and
at credit reporting agencies to an apartment in Manhattan. That change
apparently was accepted by defendants without serious inquiry or requiring any
proof that the plaintiffs had actually moved. The "fraud address" was then
spread by three major credit reporting agencies, which sold their names and new
addresses to other banks seeking to offer them pre-approved credit cards. Those
offers were sent to the imposter at the fraud address and the imposter had more
than enough information to complete the applications and obtain the credit
cards. The imposter ran up $100,000 in fraudulent charges. The plaintiffs were
alerted to the fraud by one of their banks which noticed a dramatically different
spending pattern. The plaintiffs immediately closed all of their credit accounts
and began to rebuild their credit files. Unfortunately, the credit reporting
agencies continued to sell the plaintiffs' name coupled with the fraud address to
other banks offering them credit.
Worsley, supra note 60, at 72.
95. Worsley, supra note 60, at 72.
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fraud.96 It thus declined to hold the banks liable "even when [it] failed to
take any steps whatsoever to confirm the applicant's identity and where
they could have easily and inexpensively done so" because the bank was
under no legal duty do so." Furthermore, the court held that the
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for negligence because the
issuers "had no special relationship either with the impostor who stole
the plaintiffs' credit information and fraudulently obtained credit cards,
or with plaintiffs, with whom they stood simply in a creditor/debtor
relationship."' 8 New York's intermediate appellate court upheld the trial
court by refusing to recognize that banks have a duty to take greater
steps to protect customers from identity theft. 99
2. The South CarolinaSupreme Court Refuses To Recognize Negligent
Enablementof Impostor Fraud
In the recent South Carolina Supreme Court case, Huggins v. Citibank,
N.A., °°Kenneth Huggins, a non-customer, sued three banks alleging that
they negligently issued credit cards to an impostor who subsequently
used the cards without repaying the banks.1"1 Huggins claimed that the
banks were negligent on four bases:
1) [I]ssuing the credit cards without any investigation,
verification, or corroboration of [the impostor's] identity;
2) failing to adopt policies reasonably designed to verify the
identity of credit card applicants; 3) adopting policies designed
to result in the issuance of credit cards without verifying the
identity of applicants; and 14)
attempting to collect [the
0
impostor's] debt from Huggins. 2
Because the case presented unanswered questions of South Carolina
state law, the state supreme court examined three main issues.' °
96.
97.
98.
holding
99.

Polzer,682 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
Worsley, supra note 60, at 72.
Polzer, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 195; see also supra note 77 (explaining the Smith court's
that banks do not owe a duty to non-customers).
See Polzer, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 195.

100. 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
101. Id. at 276. Huggins claimed that the impostor had applied for sixcredit cards in
Huggins' name, which the banks issued, and the impostor used them for cash advances and
purchases without making any payments. Shannon P. Duffy, Ballard Team Wins Major
Identity Theft Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12, 2003, WL 8112/2003 TLI 3. As a
result, Huggins was pursued by collection agencies. Id.
102. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 276; see also Trager, supra note 46 (stating that Huggins
complained about the banks' lack of verification procedures). As evidence of his suffered
damages, Huggins pointed to his damaged credit, hounding by collection agencies,
personal distress and embarrassment, and the expense of much time and effort to resolve
the damage. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 276.
103. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 276.
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First, the court addressed whether South Carolina law recognized the
tort of negligent enablement of impostor fraudi" Second, the court
looked at the possible elements of the tort if South Carolina were to
recognize it.' Third, the court questioned whether Huggins stated a
claim for relief.' °6
To address these three issues, the court explored the relationship that
existed between Huggins and the banks to determine whether a duty of
care existed between them. 0 7 The court focused on the fact that Huggins
was not a customer at any of the banks.
It explained that "[in a
negligence action, the court must determine, as a matter of law, whether
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff."1 °9 The court defined
duty as "'the obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct

toward another..' 0 According to the court, therefore, duty arises from
an existing relationship between an alleged wrongdoer and an injured
party."'
Huggins argued that the increase in occurrence of identity theft makes
the fraud foreseeable by the banks."2 The court nevertheless maintained

that negligence law required proof of a relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant to establish the requisite duty of care. 3 The Court
further reasoned that "the relationship, if any, between credit card
issuers and potential victims of identity theft is far too attenuated to rise

104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 276-78.
108. Id. at 277 & n.2.
109. Id. at 276.
110. Id. at 277 (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor, 529 S.E.2d 549, 552 (S.C. 2000)); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 53.
"[Diuty" is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the
same-to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the
apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the
standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty.
Id.
111. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277. The court went on to explain that the relationship
between the parties must be "recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of care" for
negligence liability to attach. Id.
112. Duffy, supra note 101.
113. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277. "In the absence of a duty to prevent an injury,
foresecability of that injury is an insufficient basis on which to rest liability." Id. Indeed,
the court explained that "[e]ven though it is foreseeable that injury may arise by the
negligent issuance of a credit card, foresecability alone does not give rise to a duty." Id.
The court insisted that "It]heconcept of duty in tort liability will not be extended beyond
reasonable limits." Id.
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to the level of a duty between them."' 1 4 Thus, while the court expressed
great concern "about the rampant growth of identity theft and financial
fraud in this country,""' 5 it nevertheless held that "South Carolina does
not recognize the tort of negligent enablement of impostor fraud."" 6
II. THE FCRA

ULTIMATELY FAILS TO ADDRESS IDENTITY THEFT
ADEQUATELY

A. FCRA Improvements and Inadequacies Under Senate Bill 1753

Congress amended the FCRA to protect consumers by "specifying a
higher standard of care for CRAs, furnishers, and users of credit
reports." 7 Some argue, however, that the FCRA has not realized its
objective fully." 8 Even those closely involved with the drafting of the
1996 amendments have recently described the "need to recognize the
reality that the Amendments have not achieved their goal and that in too

many instances consumers who want to protect their good name must
sue."" 9 The U.S. credit reporting system relies on "voluntary reporting

from

thousands

of furnishers

of credit-related

information."

120

Therefore, some contend that "the voluntary nature of the reporting

process makes it particularly sensitive to the costs imposed by regulatory
and legislative mandates."

121

In reauthorizing the FCRA with a

114. Id.
115. Id. The court went so far as to say that it was "certain that some identity theft
could be prevented if credit card issuers carefully scrutinized credit card applications." Id.
However, the court took comfort in the fact that "various state and national legislation
provides at least some remedy for victims of credit card fraud." See id.
116. Id. at 278. In so holding, the court relied primarily on Polzer and Smith to
determine that no duty exists between issuers of credit cards and those potential innocent
individuals whose identities may be stolen. Id. at 277.
117. Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 482 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times).
118. See, e.g., Couch, supra note 6, at 592-97 (explaining that the FCRA does not
adequately protect consumers from identity theft).
119. Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 482 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times). Evan Hendricks "was closely involved in the
six-year process that resulted in the 1996 Amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act."
Id. at 481. Hendricks further emphasized that the "unfortunate reality under the current
system for many consumers who are victims of inaccurate credit reports and/or identity
theft is that they can only force CRAs and furnishers to truly reinvestigate and correct
errors by filing a lawsuit." Id. at 482.
120. STATEN & GATE, supra note 23, at 2.
121. Id. Staten and Cate further explain that
a large part of the legislative balancing act undertaken in crafting the original
FCRA was intended to foster accurate reports without discouraging reporting.
. . . Consequently, over the past 32 years, Congress has been notably cautious
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particular mind towards identity theft, Congress attempted to find a
proper balance between consumer protection and efficient credit
reporting. 2 2 The bill reauthorizing the FCRA addresses many of the
Act's previous shortcomings regarding identity theft. 123 However,
consumer protection groups remain concerned that the bill fails to
provide proper privacy protections and ultimately preempts stronger
state protections.124 Senator Dianne Feinstein opposes the bill because
she believes that it would "reduce the new privacy protections provided
to Californians under the state's new financial privacy law, which sets the
strictest financial privacy standards in the country."' 25 While the Senate
rejected Feinstein's amendment, which "would have restricted the
sharing of consumers' personal data by some affiliated entities," the bill
2
Senate
nonetheless addresses the sharing of consumer information.
Bill 1753 also proposes improvements in the area of accuracy of
consumer information. 27 However, the bill adopts the remedial
approach to discovery of inaccuracies, which places a heavy burden on
about imposing new requirements on either [credit] bureaus or data furnishers
without a clear indication of a problem that required legislative intervention.
Id.
122. See id. at 21.
123. Senate Passes Bill, supra note 55, at 2263-64.
124. Id. at 2263.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2263-64.
Specifically the bill requires affiliates that exchange consumer information for
market solicitation purposes to alert the consumer of such practice and allow the
consumer to prohibit all solicitation for marketing purposes for a five-year
period.
The bill also directs the federal agencies to promulgate regulations limiting
affiliate sharing of consumer information for solicitation purposes.
With respect to the sharing of medical information, the bill would require
specific affirmative consumer consent, or "opt-in," regarding the use and sharing
of medical information by consumer reporting agencies for employment or
insurance purposes.
id. at 2264.
127. Id. The article continues:
The bill mandates the promulgation of federal regulations to enhance the
accuracy of consumer credit reports by requiring notice to any consumer
receiving an extension or grant of credit based on a counter offer by the creditor
on material terms, including interest rate, that are materially less favorable than
the terms generally available from the creditor to consumers, based in whole or
in part on a consumer report.
Consumer reporting agencies that determine, upon investigation, that
information in a consumer's credit file was inaccurate, incomplete, or unverified
would be obligated, promptly to delete or modify such information and notify
the furnisher of the correction. The furnisher of the information would also have
to take corrective action.

2005]

Identity Theft

consumers to routinely check the accuracy of their credit reports. 28 The
Fair and Accurate Transactions Act of 2003 amended the FCRA129 by
allowing consumers, upon request, to obtain one free copy of their credit
report per year in an attempt to help them monitor their financial
information so that they can correct any errors. 3 However, consumers
are nevertheless required to request their credit reports.
Some argue that the federal preemption provisions provide standards
under which national creditors may operate without having to adjust to
fifty potentially different regiments. 3' However, the existing federal
privacy preemptions in the FCRA effectively prevent states from holding
32
CRAs liable for negligent dissemination of personal information.
Furthermore, the preemptions also prevent states from holding banks
liable for negligently issuing credit cards to impostors. 3 3 Opponents
argue that these national standards weaken consumers' ability to enforce
their own rights by creating too many loopholes through which negligent
CRAs may escape liability. ' 34 Indeed, some contend that these provisions
128. See STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 21-24.
129. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat 1952 (2003).
130. Prevention, CYBERCRIME L. REP., Jan. 12, 2004, WL 4 NO. I CYBERCRLR 1.
The act also enables consumers to place an alert on their credit files, and it
requires credit reporting agencies to block potentially fraudulent information on
consumer credit reports as soon as the consumer submits a police report.
Finally, the act requires merchants to truncate account numbers on credit or
debit card receipts to prevent identity thieves from accessing account
information from discarded or stolen receipts.
Id.
131. See Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 482 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times).
132. See supra note 48; see also Couch, supra note 6, at 587 ("IThe Act expressly
preempts state common law or statutory remedies, making the FCRA the sole recovery
tool in actions within its scope.").
133. See Couch, supra note 6, at 587.
134. For example, § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) of the FCRA "merely requires that creditors not
furnish information that they know or consciously avoid knowing is inaccurate."
Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 493 (testimony of Evan Hendricks,
Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times). Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) states: "A
person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting
agency if the person knows or consciously avoids knowing that the information is
inaccurate." 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (2000). Furthermore, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(a)(1)(B) states that "[a] person shall not furnish information relating to a consumer to
any consumer reporting agency if-(i) the person has been notified by the consumer, at
the address specified by the person for such notices, that specific information is inaccurate;
and (ii) the information is in fact, inaccurate." Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(B). Moreover, 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(2) states that
a person who(A) regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to
one or more consumer reporting agencies about the person's transactions or
experiences with any consumer; and
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impede identity theft victims from holding negligent creditors and CRAs
liable under common law for economic, psychological, and emotional
suffering.'35 In reauthorizing the preemptions with new provisions
addressing identity theft, Congress attempted to strike a balance between

and preserving the efficiency of the national credit
protecting consumers
36
system.1
reporting
Although the FCRA's preemption provisions bind states with respect
to the collection and dissemination of personal information, state
legislatures can take action to prevent identity theft. 137 Some state
legislatures, like those in California and Georgia, believe they should
enact preventative legislation designed to thwart identity theft before it
can take place. 8 They argue that protective state legislation must limit
(B) has furnished to a consumer reporting agency information that the
person determines is not complete or accurate, shall promptly notify the
consumer reporting agency of that determination and provide to the agency any
corrections to that information, or any additional information, that is necessary
to make the information provided by the person to the agency complete and
accurate, and shall not thereafter furnish to the agency any of the information
that remains not complete or accurate.
Id. § 1681s-2(a)(2) (2000). Finally, under § 1681s-2(b), customers can only enforce their
own rights after "(1) they dispute the credit grantors' errors with the CRA, (2) the CRA
communicates that dispute to the credit grantor, and, (3) the credit grantor reports the
disputed inaccurate information again." Preemption ProvisionsHearings, supra note 4, at
493 (testimony of Evan Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2(b) (2000).
135. See Sovern, supra note 23, at 401-02. Section 1681h(e) of the FCRA provides:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no
consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation,
invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information
against any consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or any person
who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency, based on information
disclosed pursuant to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on
information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against
whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report
except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure
such consumer.
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000). Indeed, consumers rarely avoid this preclusion by showing
that a firm acted with malice or willful intent to injure the consumer. Sovern, supra note
23, at 402-03; see id. at 402 n.250 (explaining that "[c]ourts have interpreted the word
'malice' in light of defamation law as meaning that the statement was made 'with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"'
(citation omitted)). "Some victims of identity thieves have found a way around the
preemption by suing for malicious prosecution. But malicious prosecution is not an easy
action to bring successfully, and, in any event, many consumer victims of identity theft are
not the subject of prosecution." Id. at 402-03 (footnotes omitted).
136. See STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 21-24.
137. See supra note 52, for examples of state action designed to prevent identity theft.
138. See supra note 52.
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society's widespread use of personal identifying information. 9 While
forty-eight states currently have identity theft laws in place,'" almost all
obstacles facing
these laws fail to address one of the most significant
14 1
identity theft victims: the statute of limitations.
B. Federal Case Law Underscores Obstacles for Consumers
TRW Inc. v. Andrews14 highlights a particular difficulty for victims
bringing suit under the FCRA by narrowing the two-year statute of
limitations. 143 The Andrews Court protected CRAs by limiting the time
during which injured plaintiffs could bring negligence suits.'"4 Arguably,
by the time victims know to file suit against negligent creditors, the twoyear statute of limitations may have already run. Identity theft victims
often do not "learn of the crime for a year or more, only after something
goes terribly wrong, because thieves often shield their actions by using 45a
different address when they open new accounts in the victim's name.',
Congress realized this problem and extended the statute of limitations
under Senate Bill 1753 from two to seven years after the date of
violation, but no later than two years after discovery of the violaton.'
Because uncertainty remains as to the application of Andrews' holding to
identity
state-law identity theft claims, states must enact comprehensive
47
theft laws that directly address the statute of limitations.1
Smith v. Citibank, N.A.' 4 erected greater impediments to victims suing
negligent banks and CRAs under the FCRA.' 9 Section 1681s-2 of the
FCRA 5 ° makes it difficult to trigger a bank's duty to investigate disputes
regarding liability for amounts due on a consumer's account. 15 1 Some
139. See supra note 52.
140. Michael W. Perl, It's Not Always About the Money: Why the State Identity Theft
Laws Fail To Adequately Address Criminal Record Identity Theft, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 169, 183 (2003).
141. Id. at 192.
142. 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
143. See id. at 22-23.
144. Id.
145. Stop Thieves from Stealing You, supra note 4, at 12.
146. Senate Passes Bill, supra note 55, at 2263.
147. Perl, supra note 140, at 194.
148. No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-EZF, 2001 WL 34079057 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001).
149. Id. at *3.
150. Section 1681s-2(b)(1) addressing the responsibilities of furnishers of information
to CRAs provides "After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681(a)(2) of this title of a
dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a
person to a consumer reporting agency, the person shall .. . conduct an investigation with
respect to the information." 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) (2000).
151. See id. § 1681i(a)(2)(A) (providing that within five days after "a consumer
reporting agency receives notice of a dispute from any consumer in accordance with
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argue that the remedial approach adopted by Congress in the FCRA
provides the most cost-efficient way of detecting and investigating errors
on consumer credit

reports.

152

However, others

argue that the

dramatically increasing incidence of identity theft necessitates a
preventative approach. 53 They believe that the notice requirement
incorporated in the national standards provides CRAs with many

for negligent reporting
loopholes through which they can avoid liability
15 4
of information and investigation of disputes.

C. Common Law Underscores Obstaclesfor Consumers
Common law negligence claims also have created difficulties for
identity theft victims trying to hold creditors liable for issuing credit cards
Because most courts have adopted the "limitation of
to impostors.5

liability to risk" theory, identity theft victims must prove that identity
theft is a foreseeable consequence of negligent dissemination of personal
information and negligent issuance of credit cards." 6 Polzer v. TRW,

Inc.1 7 demonstrates one court's refusal to recognize a duty of care
between creditors and potential victims of identity theft. The court
apparently believed that the remedial approach to consumer credit
reporting better served all parties' interests and thus requires consumers
to discover mistakes in their own credit reports."" However, one may
argue that "firms in the credit industry are better able than injured
consumers to spread the losses from identity theft among those who
benefit from credit."' 59 This suggests that courts should adopt the

section 1681i(a)(1), the agency shall provide" notice to the furnisher of information).
Howevcr, § 1681i(a)(1) requires that the consumer must notify the agency directly of a
dispute. Id. § 1681i(a)(1).
152. STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 21-22.
153. See Preemption Provisions Hearings,supra note 4, at 481-82 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times) (arguing that the current approach is
inadequate). But cf STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 21-24.
154. Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 493 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times). In practice, the national standards have
proven ineffective because they create too many hoops through which consumers must
jump before simple errors can be corrected. Id.
155. See, e.g., Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
156. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 43.
157. 682 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1998).
158. See Worsley, supra note 60, at 72. The Polzer court admitted that the banks could
have "easily and inexpensively" taken steps to confirm the credit applicant's identity. Id.
159. Sovern, supra note 23, at 405.
If credit reporting agencies and creditors were liable for the losses caused when
they report the transactions of identity thieves as the transactions of consumer
victims, they would have greater incentives to take steps to prevent identity theft.
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"liability beyond the risk" theory with respect to furnisher negligence. 0
The current system requires only that credit bureaus "follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" when reporting on an
individual. ' 6 It may be argued further that such a system allows the
agencies to avoid the damaging consequences of identity theft while
62
shifting the entire burden to bear the cost to the innocent consumer.
The Huggins v. Citibank, N.A. 6 court also refused to recognize the
tort of negligent enablement of impostor fraud because no duty of care
exists "between credit card issuers and those individuals whose identities
may be stolen."' 64 Indeed, no statutory or common law duty currently
exists between negligent credit card issuers and potential victims of
identity theft.16 The Huggins court held that the relationship "between
credit card issuers and potential victims of identity theft is far too
attenuated to rise to the level of a duty.', 166 However, at least one
commentator contends that as between a negligent issuer of a credit card
and an innocent consumer, the bank can better shoulder the loss incurred
from identity theft. 67 Furthermore, it can be argued that liability should
ultimately fall on the wrongdoer when the mistakes of negligent creditors
and CRAs affect innocent consumers. 166

• . . At present, creditors are liable under the FCRA for misreporting
information only in one of two situations: when they furnish information to a
credit reporting agency knowing, or consciously avoiding knowing, that the
information is inaccurate; or when they have been notified by the consumer of
the erroneous information and the information is in fact inaccurate. . . . The
FCRA thus offers too much protection to creditors and insulates them from the
effects of reporting erroneous information. The result is that creditors have little
incentive to make sure that their reports are accurate.
Id. at 405-06.
160. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 43.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2000); see also Sovern, supra note 23, at 405-06 (arguing
that "credit reporting agencies, which currently are liable only when they fail to follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy-which seems to mean no
more than ordinary negligence should be made strictly liable for attributing the
transactions of identity thieves to innocent consumers").
162. Sovern, supra note 23, at 390 (stating that "credit bureaus that attribute the
conduct of an identity thief to someone else are immune from liability under the statute
provided they acted as a reasonably prudent person would").
163. 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
164. Id. at 277.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See Sovern, supra note 23, at 384. With reforms that hold creditors and CRAs
more liable, "[tihe cost of credit may increase slightly, but to the hundreds of thousands of
victims of identity theft each year it will be a cost worth paying." Id. at 406.
168. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 43.
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III. CONGRESS AND THE STATES MUST WIELD A STRONGER HAND
AGAINST IDENTITY THIEVES

A. Congress Must Better ProtectIdentity Theft Victims
Congress must hold CRAs, furnishers, and users of credit reports to a

higher standard of care to sufficiently protect the use and dissemination
169
Under the FCRA's
of consumers' personal identifying information.
existing national standards, which merely require that creditors not
furnish information that either they know is inaccurate or they
consciously avoid knowing is inaccurate, 170 creditors can freely
disseminate information that they have failed to adequately investigate."'
The remedial approach incorporated into the Act by Congress provides
some incentive for a credit bureau to prevent errors because the
reverification process remains costly for both credit bureaus and
creditors. 172 However, this approach reinforces the financial incentive for
bureaus to invest in accurate reporting and prevent only those errors for
which they have a comparative advantage .3 Clearly, these national
standards do allow "credit grantors too much leeway to engage in sloppy
reporting practices., 174 Although the Senate bill addresses the accuracy
of consumer information, the Act still relies on consumers to discover

Congress again has placed a
inaccuracies in their own credit reports.
heavy burden on consumers to initiate an error detection and correction
mechanism. 7 6 While this apparently represents the most cost-effective

approach because consumers can theoretically determine accuracy at the
lowest cost, this policy mandates that consumers routinely check their

169. The Act merely "places burdens on those in positions of reporting, compiling and
using information" that are "reasonable under the circumstances" and "necessary to meet
the goals of the Act." Couch, supra note 6, at 597.
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (2000) ("A person shall not furnish any
information relating to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or consciously
avoids knowing that the information is inaccurate.").
171. Where a user or CRA does not willfully or negligently disregard the requirements
of the Act, the Act "effectively shifts the burden of identity theft to ... defenseless
consumers." Couch, supra note 6, at 593.
172. See STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 22-23.
173. Indeed, the Andrews Court "focused not on the burden to the credit reporting
agencies, but on the overall reasonableness of their procedures in light of the specific facts
of the case." Couch, supra note 6, at 595.
174. Preemption Provisions Hearing, supra note 4, at 482 (testimony of Evan
Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times).
175. By requiring that CRAs do not willfully disregard the Act's requirements, the
burden is shifted from them to the consumers. Couch, supra note 6, at 593.
176. STATEN & CATE, supra note 23, at 21.
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credit history. 7 7 Unfortunately, most victims of identity theft remain
unaware of the dangers posed by the crime and fail to adequately
Therefore,
a
preventative
scrutinize their own credit reports.
approach that mandates stricter procedures for CRAs and creditors in
"submitting, verifying, matching, and re-investigating information on
credit files" would better protect against identity theft.178 While this
might increase operating costs that would ultimately pass to consumers,
creditors can spread their costs among hundreds of thousands of
consumers rather than forcing victims of identity theft to bear the entire
cost alone."' In placing the responsibility for monitoring file accuracy on
the consumer, the FCRA essentially relieves credit bureaus of the duty
to adequately investigate consumer information before mistakes occur.""
In light of the dramatically increasing rate of identity theft, bureaus
should have a greater role in preventing the crime before it occurs.181
State legislatures should also take preventative action by enacting laws
similar to those passed in California and Georgia.1s By taking steps to
prevent careless dissemination of personal information, states can adopt
their own preventative approach to battling
8 identity theft that would
compliment the FCRA's remedial approach. 1
Furthermore, the existing notice requirement on which the Smith court
relied makes it too difficult for consumers to trigger a CRA's duty to
investigate9" Presumably, the average consumer remains unaware of
this intricate notification process mandated by the FCRA. Congress
must amend the Act to facilitate the process through which consumers
can correct errors made by credit issuers. 1815 Consumers should not have
177. See id. Indeed, "the consumer is the only person who knows the true credit
history which the credit file attempts to describe." Id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 23.
180. See id. at 22. "Essentially, the FCRA designates the consumer as the 'qualitycontrol' inspector with the authority to mandate reinvestigation (and alert potential
purchasers) of credit information when errors are detected." Id.
181. Indeed, the users and reporters of consumer financial information are in the best
position to carry "the burden of following 'reasonable procedures' to ensure use for
'permissible purposes' aimed at 'maximum possible accuracy"' identified in the Act.
Couch, supra note 6, at 597.
182. See supra note 52.
183. See supra note 52.
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring the consumer to notify the CRA
directly of the dispute).
185. Under the current system, a CRA must verify or delete disputed information
from a consumer's file within thirty days of the consumer's notification. Id. The reporting
agency must notify the furnisher of the disputed information within five business days of
receiving such notice, and the furnisher must either verify or correct the information
furnished to the reporting agency. Id. § 1681i(a)(2)(A), (5)(A). Although the consumer
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to meet the strict technical requirement of directly notifying the CRA of
a dispute.1 6 Unfortunately, most consumers remain unaware of the
mandatory procedures necessary to trigger a CRA's duty to investigate.
By amending § 1681i of the Act and making this duty easier to trigger,
Congress could better protect consumer interests and simultaneously
promote accuracy in the national credit reporting system.
B. FederalCourts Must Better Protect Identity Theft Victims
victims
by applying the
theft
Federal courts can better protect identity
•
•
•187
FCRA with a heavier hand against negligent creditors and CRAs. The
new provisions in H.R. 2622 addressing the statute of limitations will give
victims five more years to file claims under the FCRA' 8 Senate Bill
1723 proposed an amendment to the Act requiring an action under the
FCRA to be brought "not later than 2 years after the date on which the
violation is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of
reasonable diligence."" 9 This new limitations period for civil liability
under the Act will better enable the FCRA to achieve its original
purpose by protecting consumers against negligent dissemination of
personal information."' Indeed, courts now will no longer have to follow

should theoretically rest assured that the information will either be removed or proven
correct within thirty days of notification, the process nonetheless remains a comprehensive
scheme too detailed for the average consumer to fully comprehend.
186. Contra, e.g., Smith v. Citibank, N.A., No. 00-0587-CV-W-I-EZF, 2001 WL
34079057, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001). The court said that the claim would have failed
because the plaintiff neglected to notify the agency directly of a dispute pursuant
§ 1681i(a)(1) of the Act, and thus the CRA's duty to investigate was not triggered, Id.
187. See Couch, supra note 6, at 597.
188, See 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2000). Section 1681p provides that any enforcement
action must be brought
within two years from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a
defendant has . . ,willfully misrepresented any information required under [the
FCRAJ to be disclosed to [the plaintiff] and the information ... is material to [a
claim brought under the FCRAJ, the action may be brought within two years
after [the plaintiff's] discovery of the misrepresentation.
id.; see also Preemption Provisions Hearings, supra note 4, at 194 (statement of Michael
W. Naylor, Director of Advocacy, AARP).
189. S.1723, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001). House Bill 3387 suggested inserting "before the
end of the 3-year period beginning on the date by which the violation giving rise to the
liability is discovered or reasonably should been discovered by the consumer." H.R. 3387,
107th Cong. § 2 (2001).
190. As one commentator noted,
8
the language "liability arises" from § 16 1p does not foreclose use of the
discovery rule, and the most logical interpretation is that liability arises when the
potential plaintiff first learns of the violation. This proposition is clearly
supported by the legislative history of § 1681p, which demonstrates that the
Supreme Court's interpretation in Andrews is contrary to congressional intent.
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the precedent that dismissed the claim in Andrews for exceeding the twoyear statute of limitations, even when the plaintiff did not know that
someone had stolen her identity.'9'
Federal courts must also recognize a duty of care between banks and
non-customers when a bank negligently issues a credit card to an
impostor. As between a negligent issuer of a credit card and an innocent
consumer, the creditor can better bear the loss incurred as a result of
identity theft and the CRAs can better avoid the damage through
heightened controls. 192 Furthermore, in such a case, the negligent
creditor clearly acts in a more wrongful manner than does the innocent
consumer.9 Courts in the past have held that issuers of credit have no
special relationship with identity theft victims or impostors who steal
their personal information. 94 However, courts must acknowledge that
the increase in identity theft has effectively created a relationship
between creditors and consumers giving rise to a higher duty of care. 95
Recognition of such a relationship will force CRAs and issuers of credit
cards to act with greater care with respect to consumers' personal
information. 96
C. State Courts Must Better ProtectIdentity Theft Victims
State courts must recognize the new tort of negligent enablement of
impostor fraud. The Huggins court's reference to the "rampant growth
of identity theft and financial fraud in this country" evinces the need to
address America's fastest growing white collar crime. 97 State courts
must adopt the "liability beyond the risk" theory when examining
common law negligence claims against credit bureaus and CRAs.' 9s This
will require the exercise of greater care in disseminating personal
information and in issuing credit cards. While CRAs argue that identity
theft remains an unforeseeable consequence of such negligence, the
crime's unbridled proliferation confirms that they should anticipate its

Latasha D. McDade, Note, Data Rape: Assault by an Unknown Predator- The Supreme
Court Went Wrong in TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 395, 416 (2004).

Nonetheless, the Andrews Court prevented recovery because the narrow two-year statute
of limitations had run. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 22-23 (2001).
191. See Andrews, 534 U.S. at 23-24.
192. See Couch, supra note 6, at 593.
193. See id.
194. See, e.g., Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 2003).
195. See supra Part II.B (discussing the obstacles that identity theft victims face).
196. See supra Part lI.B.
197. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277.
198. See supra Part II.C.
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occurrence.' 9 Indeed, the escalating prevalence of identity theft makes
the crime a reasonably foreseeable consequence of negligent
dissemination of a consumer's personal information.0 ° In the exercise of
ordinary care, a CRA should anticipate that negligent reporting could
possibly injure consumers even when a credit bureau might not
anticipate the particular injury that might occur.""
By employing "liability beyond the risk," courts can establish a legal
2denttes.0
duty for an issuer of credit cards to confirm applicants'
"Limitation of liability to the risk" enables CRAs and banks to
disseminate personal information and issue credit cards without serious
inquiry or proof that the consumer is in fact who he or she claims to be.23
Indeed, the Polzer court refused to hold the bank liable "even when they
failed to take any steps whatsoever to confirm the applicant's identity
done so." 204
and where they could have easily and inexpensively
"Liability beyond the risk" will impose a greater duty on CRAs and
creditors to exercise greater care and thus significantly reduce the
possibility of identity theft.2°5
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress designed the FCRA to regulate CRAs and the creditors to
whom they supply information. Unfortunately, millions of identity theft
victims like those introduced at the beginning of this Comment serve as
living proof that the FCRA has not achieved its goal. Congress recently
addressed the failure of the Act in its recent reauthorization, which
However,
included remedial provisions addressing identity theft.
identity
an
age
where
in
better
protection
even
innocent consumers need
First,
information.
personal
thieves can easily obtain another person's
that
the
FCRA
into
Congress must incorporate a preventative approach
submitting,
and
CRAs
creditors
for
procedures
mandates stricter
verifying, matching, and re-investigating information on credit files. This
preventative approach will preclude identity theft before it can occur.
Additionally, state legislatures must take preventative action to inhibit

199. See Couch, supra note 6, at 593 (stating that the outcome of the FCRA is flawed
because of its failure to effectively address the burden of avoiding identity theft).
200. Cf id. (pointing out that CRAs are only liable when they act willfully). The
CRAs and users of credit reports can avoid the damages of identity theft through
heightened controls. Id.
201. See id.
202. See supra Part II.C (discussing cases in which courts have failed to recognize a
duty).
203. See supra Part II.C.
204. Worsley, supra note 60, at 72.
205, See supra Part II.C.
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overuse of personal information throughout the United States. Congress
must also modify the FCRA's notification requirement so that consumers
trying to dispute their credit reports can do so more easily. Most
consumers remain unaware of the stringent procedures currently
required under the Act for reporting disputes to CRAs, who then notify
furnishers of information. Third, Congress must establish a duty of care
between negligent issuers of credit cards and innocent victims of identity
theft. Creditors and CRAs can spread the costs associated with
preventing identity theft to hundreds of thousands of consumers with
ease. Furthermore, the increasing incidence of the crime indicates that a
relationship does in fact exist between creditors and consumers that gives
rise to a duty of care with respect to the collection and dissemination of
consumers' personal information. Finally, state courts must protect
identity theft victims by employing the "liability beyond the risk" theory
and ultimately recognize the new tort of negligent enablement of
impostor fraud. Otherwise, many more millions of Americans will suffer
the "physically, emotionally, psychologically, spiritually, and financially
...

life altering experience" of identity theft.2°6

206.

See FightingIdentity Theft Hearing,supra note 2.
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